Decrypting TLS: seeing inside HTTPS, with certificates
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Over 90% of Burrow's web traffic is HTTPS. The IPS and antivirus you just enabled are mostly looking at scrambled bytes. "We can decrypt," Maya says, "but it's a privacy decision as much as a technical one. We'll exempt banking and health sites, tell staff, and get legal to sign off."
Key points
- Certificate inspection reads only the unencrypted parts of the handshake (server name, certificate). It's cheap and good for web filtering by site, but can't see content.
- Full / deep inspection (outbound): the firewall acts as a trusted middle-man. It opens its own TLS session to the website, checks the real certificate, then signs a substitute certificate with its own CA for the user. Devices must trust that CA, usually pushed by Group Policy or MDM.
- If the real website's certificate is bad (expired, self-signed), the firewall should sign with an untrusted CA so the user still sees a warning rather than having it hidden.
- Inbound inspection protects your own servers: you load the server's certificate and private key on the firewall so it can decrypt traffic coming in.
- Exempt categories like finance and health, and apps that use certificate pinning (they break when intercepted). Some newer engines can fingerprint encrypted traffic to spot malware without decrypting it.
The full lesson has more: animations, a hands-on exercise, 3 quiz questions and spaced review cards. Open it free →